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Abstract 
 
The theoretical and policy literature on decentralization has long asserted since Oates (1972) that 
decentralized governance increases allocative efficiency in the public sector. But, despite the colossal 
growth in the literature on decentralization and fiscally decentralized systems in the real world over the 
past four decades, this hypothesis has gone untested, largely because of the difficulties of deriving 
measures of allocative efficiency. In this paper we offer an indirect test of the allocative efficiency 
hypothesis by examining how decentralized governance affects the expression of preferences for public 
goods. Specifically, we examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the functional 
composition of public expenditures. Using a distance-sensitive representative agent model, we 
hypothesize that higher levels of fiscal decentralization induce agents to demand increased production of 
publicly provided private goods. We test this hypothesis using an unbalanced panel data set of 59 
developed and developing countries covering a 30-year period. We find that expenditure decentralization 
positively and significantly influences the share of health and education expenditures in the consolidated 
government budgets; this finding is robust across multiple estimators. Decentralized governance thus 
appears to alter the composition of public expenditures towards publicly provided private goods. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The application of fiscal decentralization reforms and demand for fiscal decentralization 
policy design has grown significantly in developed and developing countries in the past three 
decades (Bird, Ebel, & Wallich, 1995; Campbell, 2003; Dillinger, 1994; Martinez-Vazquez & 
McNab, 2003; Martinez-Vazquez & Vaillancourt, 2010; Oates, 2005). Diverse economic and 
political factors, from the pursuit of increased economic efficiency to the expansion of 
democratic governance, have driven this wave of decentralization reforms (Arzaghi & 
Henderson, 2005; Shah & Chaudhry, 2004). Researchers and policymakers alike have promoted 
decentralization reform agendas on the premise that decentralization results in a more efficient 
allocation of public goods by enabling local governments, which have better information, to 
tailor more closely their public spending decisions to the needs and preferences of their 
constituencies (Oates, 1972, 1999). Theoretically, a significant body of work suggests that fiscal 
decentralization, under certain conditions, promotes allocative efficiency (Diamantaras & Gilles, 
1996; Mas-Colell, 1980; Oates, 1972; Rubinfeld, 1987). However, despite the growth in 
decentralization literature over the past four decades, this basic hypothesis has gone untested, 
largely because of the difficulties of deriving measures of allocative efficiency.1  
While efficiency increases in public service delivery have been attributed to fiscal 
decentralization programs (Alderman, 1998; de Sousa Santos, 1998; Galasso & Ravallion, 2005; 
King & Ozler, 1998), the complexity of generating standardized measurements of allocative 
                                                
1 In contrast, there is a very large literature measuring the impact of decentralization on an array of economic 
variables, such as economic growth or poverty, and institutional variables, such as corruption or voters’ 
participation. Part of this literature also looks at the impact of fiscal decentralization on public service delivery 
outcomes in education, public health and so on. For a recent survey, see Martinez-Vazquez (2011).  A considerable 
share of this literature can be interpreted as examining the productive efficiency (as opposed to allocative efficiency) 
of fiscally decentralized governance. The emphasis in Oates (1972) and the subsequent theoretical literature was not 
to claim that decentralized systems can deliver cheaper services (production efficiency) but that they can deliver the 
right services better matching the preferences of voters (allocative efficiency) vis-à-vis the case of centralized 
delivery.  
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efficiency across countries has handicapped empirical research on the hypothesized impact of 
decentralization on allocative efficiency. Implicit in the argument that decentralization can 
increase allocative efficiency, however, is the implication that a change in the level of 
decentralization is likely to alter the composition of public expenditures. In comparison to using 
direct measures of allocative efficiency, examining the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and composition of public expenditures is relatively straightforward.  
Recent papers have considered the determinants of the composition of public 
expenditures (Barro, 1990; Devarajan, Swaroop, & Zou, 1996; Fan & Rao, 2003; Sanz & 
Velázquez, 2004; Shelton, 2007; Shonchoy, 2010). While this literature offers insight on the 
determinants of the composition of public expenditures, none of these studies explicitly 
examines the potential influence of fiscal decentralization on expenditure composition and its 
link to allocative efficiency. An emerging literature, however, studies the influence of 
decentralization on expenditure composition (Alegre, 2010; Ashworth, Galli, & Padovano, 2009; 
Busemeyer, 2008; Faguet, 2004; Fiva, 2006; Kwon, 2003). This paper surveys and extends this 
literature. 
The main goal of this paper is to offer an indirect test of decentralization’s allocative 
efficiency effects by examining its role in the composition of public expenditures. First, we 
explore the theoretical linkages between decentralized governance and expenditure composition 
by means of a distance-sensitive representative agent model. Then we estimate the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on the level and functional composition of public expenditures using an 
unbalanced panel data set spanning 59 developed and developing economies over a period of 30 
years.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly 
review the two strands of literature on the determinants of the composition of public expenditure 
and, more specifically, the impact of fiscal decentralization on expenditure composition. In the 
third section, we develop a distance-sensitive representative agent model to explore the potential 
influence of decentralization on expenditure composition. The fourth section discusses the data 
and presents the estimation results. In the last section of the paper, we conclude and offer 
suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
 Over the last two decades, a large literature has developed on the relationship between 
the composition of public expenditures and a variety of macroeconomic variables, including 
welfare and human capital, income inequality, macroeconomic stability, fiscal competition, 
globalization and economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Brueckner, 2006; Devarajan et al., 1996; 
Dreher, Sturm, & Ursprung, 2006; Gupta, Clements, Baldacci, & Mulas-Granados, 2002; 
Matovu, 2000; Sanz & Velázquez, 2004; Turnovsky & Fisher, 1995). In addition, several authors 
have examined whether there is empirical evidence to support Wagner’s Law on rising public 
expenditures (Akitoby, Clements, Gupta, & Inchauste, 2006; Durevall & Henrekson, 2011; 
Shelton, 2007; Shonchoy, 2010; Zaghini & Lamartina, 2008) while others have examined the 
influence of corruption on the composition of expenditures (Gupta, de Mello, & Sharan, 2001; 
Mauro, 1998). 
The contributions are fewer with respect to our narrower interest in the question of 
whether fiscal decentralization influences the composition of public expenditures.  A strand of 
the literature has researched whether fiscal decentralization would result in the concentration of 
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public expenditures on the provision of services related to poverty alleviation (Bird & 
Vaillancourt, 1998; Fox, 1995; Fox & Aranda, 1996).  Decentralization in Bolivia from 1991 to 
1996, for example, resulted in increased investment in socially oriented sectors, such as 
education, urban development, water and sanitation, and health care (Faguet, 2001).  In addition, 
the empirical evidence suggests that decentralization unambiguously increased education 
expenditures in OECD countries (Busemeyer, 2007).   However, the impact of decentralization 
on healthcare or social security expenditures in OECD countries remains an unsettled question 
(Ashworth et al., 2009; Busemeyer, 2008; Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2011).  Health and 
education expenditures may also be pro-cyclical during periods of economic expansion and 
relatively acyclical during recessionary periods (Arze del Granado, Gupta, & Hajdenberg, 2012)  
There is much less evidence on the influence of decentralization on expenditure composition in 
developing countries.   
Thus the evidence to date is suggestive of a relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and the functional composition of public expenditures. In this paper we first provide a theoretical 
basis for the argument that shifts in the composition of public expenditures under 
decentralization is reflective of improved allocative efficiency through improved matching of 
subnational preferences.  Second, in our empirical analysis, we expand and improve the 
empirical literature on the impact of decentralization on public expenditure composition 
providing an indirect test of the impact of decentralization on allocative efficiency.  
 
3. Modeling the Relationship between Decentralization and Expenditure Composition 
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The theoretical framework in this section stresses the potential heterogeneous nature of 
tastes among individuals residing in different jurisdictions as a fundamental factor of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the composition of public expenditures.  
We rely on a theoretical model that focuses only on a “representative” median-voter. We 
note, however, that the literature has criticized the application of this type of model to 
decentralization issues because representative-agent models have largely ignored the 
heterogeneity of individual preferences.2  We, however, employ a distance-sensitive utility 
function that allows us to assume that all individuals have the same general utility, but “each one 
of them” has a different preferred type of public good with independent quantity preferences. 
Intuitively, we interpret the distance between individuals as a measure of their variation in 
preferences. The further an individual is from the median voter, the greater their dissatisfaction 
with the median voter’s decision, and the less utility they derive from the provision of the public 
good in question.  
Previous work has employed distance-sensitive utility functions with one public and one 
private good (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Alesina, Baqir, & Hoxby, 2004; Alesina & 
Spolaore, 1997; Panizza, 1999).  In our theoretical framework, we extend the distance-sensitive 
representative agent model to an economy with two levels of government and two types of 
publicly provided goods. This allows us to explicitly provide a link between the representative 
agent’s utility and the composition of national and subnational public expenditures.  
More specifically, we extend from a uni-dimensional to a multi-dimensional voting 
framework Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly’s (1999) result that the optimal amount of publicly 
provided goods is a function of the “median distance from the median.” We further base our 
                                                
2 Fundamentally, decentralization would not make much sense if we assume that all individuals have identical 
preferences as representative-agent models often assume (Kirman, 1992; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). 
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model of heterogeneous preferences on two additional assumptions: a) individuals are uniformly 
distributed along a country area, and b) individual utility accrued from any given public good is 
decreasing on distance to the middle of the country or jurisdiction that provides it.  
Thus, let us assume that individuals are uniformly distributed along a country with area 
A, population N, and J local governments (where J > 1). Each agent consumes three types of 
goods: one private good (C) and two publicly provided goods: S, a Samuelsonian pure public 
good (PPG) provided solely by the central government and G, a publicly-provided private good 
(PPPG) whose provision is divided between the central government and local governments. The 
letters c, s, and g, respectively, represent the per capita consumption of these goods. For 
simplicity, we assume an exogenous level of centralization (θ) that is equal to the fraction of the 
PPPG provided by the central government.3 Education and national defense are examples of a 
PPPG and a PPG, respectively.4 
 We assume that each individual has a set of characteristics that determine their preferred 
type and quantity of the PPG and PPPG.5  The median voter at the national and local level (med s, 
med g) democratically decides the type and quantity of each public good. For this reason, it is 
possible that there may be a separate “type median voter” and “quantity median voter” for each 
public good. In order to ensure the median voter result in the presence of multidimensional 
issues, we must assume that: a) individuals vote on one issue at a time and b) individuals have 
separable preferences.6 
                                                
3 Deriving an optimal level of centralization would require the specification of a government objective function and 
the determinants of fiscal decentralization. See, for example,Panizza (1999).  
4 There may be disagreement with the choice of these two examples, but in essence we assume there are PPPG 
subject to “crowding,” as opposed to PPG, which are not. 
5 For example, education is a publicly provided good that can be clearly categorized into different types based on the 
characteristics of the educational curriculum of schools. Some educational programs may impart certain religious 
beliefs and practices while others may be mainly focused on the development of the musical abilities of the students. 
6 Enelow & Hinich (1984) show that under these assumptions cycling-- related to simultaneous multidimensional 
voting-- is avoided and that the outcome of majority voting is the optimum alternative of the median voter on each 
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 We further assume that individuals are uniformly distributed, Tiebout-sorted, and pay a 
lump sum tax t on the same income y.7 Each type of PPG is located on an ideological Euclidean 
space that captures individual preferences and represents the area of the country.8 We assume 
that voters’ optima are evenly distributed over the space, that the number of voters is large 
enough so that the space can serve as a proxy for the voters, and that the country size area is 
normalized at one with no loss of generality.9 The distribution of individuals is such that each 
alternative can be uniquely mapped in the Euclidean space.  
Based upon these assumptions, individual i’s utility function is given by: 
 
(1) 
where s, g, c, and θ are as defined previously; yic is individual i’s distance to the middle of the 
country measured on the PPG axis; xic is individual i’s distance to the middle of the country 
measured on the PPPG axis; and xij is individual i’s distance to the middle of the jurisdiction 
where he resides measured over the PPPG axis. The parameter α, where 0≤ α ≤ 1, measures 
preference heterogeneity, that is as α approaches 0, preferences become relatively more 
homogenous.  
The public budget constraint is T = G + S, where T represents general (central plus 
subnational) tax revenue and pg and ps are normalized to one.10 The representative agent’s budget 
                                                                                                                                                       
issue. Note that we do not consider any distortions to the democratic process in the model as the capture of the 
democratic process at the local and national level in  Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000) or how the democratic process 
may be offset by Leviathan local and central governments as in  Panizza (1999).  
7 Income distribution issues are assumed away, not because they are considered unimportant, but in order to isolate 
the locational efficiency effects of decentralized decision-making (Wildasin, 1991, 1994). 
8 This is an extension of the multidimensional problem (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997). 
9 These assumptions have been used in several other studies that use a Euclidean space as an analytical tool for 
spatial analysis (Davis, DeGroot, & Hinich, 1972; Plott, 1967; Tullock, 1967). 
10 The maximization of individual utility subject to the individual after tax income constraint allows us to find the 
optimal demand for public goods. Note that the individual after tax income is independent of the level of 
government providing the good and of the location of the individual. The assumptions that an income lump sum 
finances all public goods and that all individuals have equal income  guarantee independence.  Also note that we do 
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constraint is y = s + g + c or y = c + t. Let δi = 1 - α (θ xic + (1-θ ) xij ) and γi = 1 - α yic , then the 
maximization of the individual’s utility function with respect to the budget constraint generates 
the following demand functions:  
; ;  
(2) 
We can employ the Euclidean distance between two points to measure each individual’s 
distance between their preferred types of PPPGs and those actually provided. Let || z – zm || = c be 
part of a circle on which each point z = (y1, x1) has a constant Euclidean distance to the point of 
the type-median’s location zm = (ym, xm). As illustrated in Figure 1, for each individual located on 
the circle, there exists another individual with exactly the same horizontal and vertical distance 
to the center of the circle. Individuals with the same horizontal and vertical distances to the type-
median will demand the same quantity of each good.11   
Given symmetric preferences, the location of the median voter’s preferred quantity is at a 
distance equal to the ‘median distance to the median’ along the horizontal axis. For a country 
with area A, the median distance to the median is Ax/4. Let δk = 1 - α (θ xmkc + (1-θ ) xmkj ) > 0 
and γk = 1 - α ykc > 0 , ymkc be the median distance to PPG type-median, xmkc be the median 
distance to the PPPG country type-median, and xmkj be the median distance to the PPPG 
jurisdiction type-median. Using (2) we can express the quantities of g and s provided at 
equilibrium as:  
                                                                                                                                                       
not include any assumptions related to the production of public goods, such as costs differentials, or shared tax 
sources between levels of government (Caplan, 2001; Faguet, 2004; Nechyba, 1997; Wrede, 2000).   
11 This is as opposed to individuals with same Euclidean distance to type median, who will not all demand the same 
quantity of public goods. In Figure 1 all points in the circle have the same Euclidean distance to the middle. 
However, just the pairs of points situated exactly in opposite sides of the circle have same horizontal and vertical 
distances to the middle.  
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;    
(3) 
 From (2) and (3), we develop four propositions which we test empirically in the 
following section. We summarize the decision-making mechanism for both type and quantity of 
both types of public goods in Table A.1 in Appendix 1 and present, where applicable, the proofs 
of the propositions in Appendix 2.  
Propositions on Centralization and the Composition of Public Expenditure  
Given the heterogeneous preferences, as the centralization level increases the number of 
dissatisfied individuals with respect to the PPPG’s type increases accordingly. All else being 
equal, demand for PPPG expenditure is inversely related to the level of centralization. 
Conversely, demand for PPG expenditure is positively related to the level of centralization as 
individuals substitute away from PPPGs towards the centrally provided PPG. The following 
propositions summarize these results. 
Proposition 1: PPPG equilibrium quantity is decreasing in the centralization level, that is, 
 δg*k / δθ <0. 
 
Proposition 2: PPG equilibrium quantity is increasing in the centralization level, that is,  
δs*k / δθ >0. 
  
The intuition of Proposition 1 is simple. In a more centralized country there will be more 
unhappy individuals with the chosen PPPG’s type. As a result, overall demand and support for 
this kind of expenditure will be smaller, other things equal, than in a more decentralized country. 
Given that PPGs are provided centrally, the country’s median voter will decide the quantity of 
each PPG. The median voter’s decision on the provision of the PPG is inversely related to the 
median distance to the country median. Likewise, local governments provide a share of PPPG 
expenditure and the median vote of each jurisdiction decides the quantity of each PPPG. This 
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decision is inversely related to the median distance to the jurisdiction median. If more than one 
jurisdiction exists, the median distance to the country median is greater than the median distance 
to the jurisdiction median. Thus, the more decentralized the provision of public goods, the higher 
the demand for PPPGs relative to PPGs. As the level of decentralization increases, the provision 
of PPGs declines at a faster rate than the PPPGs increase, thus, the total level of public 
expenditure also declines. Intuitively, decentralized provision of public goods allows local 
governments to provide combinations of goods to each jurisdiction, as opposed to providing a 
whole package to all jurisdictions in the country like the central government may be forced to do 
(due to lack of knowledge on local preferences or other constraints).12 The following 
propositions summarize these results. 
Proposition 3: PPPG share of total expenditure is decreasing in the centralization level, that is, 
δ(g/(g+s))/ δθ <0. 
 
Proposition 4: Total public expenditure is increasing in the centralization level, that is, 
δ(g+s)/ δθ >0. 
 
The interpretation of these results is again quite straightforward. First, the central 
government chooses the level of centralization for public good provision (exogenous in this 
model). Second, if the government centralizes the public good’s provision, the preferences of the 
overall median voter will decide the “type.” If, in contrast, each jurisdiction provides the public 
good, the type-median voter of each locality will decide the “type” of public good. Once 
jurisdiction decides the type of each kind of public good, individuals decide the quantity to be 
provided. Individuals demand more publicly provided goods the closer the type is to their 
individual preferences.  
                                                
12 Note that it may be possible to get the central government to provide different packages of PPPGs to different 
jurisdictions. The central government may be able to discriminate among jurisdictions with different packages of 
services (Besley & Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2002). In this paper we keep the conventional assumption that central 
provision is homogenous for all jurisdictions. 
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Given the fact that the government centrally provides the pure public goods in our model, 
the overall median voted will decide the quantity of such goods. This decision is inversely 
related to the ‘median distance to the country median.’ Conversely, in our model, the local 
government provides a share of PPPG expenditures. The jurisdiction median voter decides the 
quantity of the PPPG. This decision is inversely related to the median distance to the jurisdiction 
median. In countries with more than just one jurisdiction, the median distance to the country 
median is higher than ‘the median distance to the jurisdiction median.’ This determines that the 
more decentralized the provision of public goods, the higher the demand for publicly provided 
private goods (as opposed to pure public goods). In other words, given the distribution of 
preferences, the more centralized the provision of goods, the lower the ratio of publicly provided 
private goods to the total amount of public goods provided.13 
Intuitively, Proposition 4 suggests that decentralized provision of public goods allows 
local government to provide specific goods or combinations of goods to each jurisdiction, rather 
than needing to provide a whole package to all jurisdictions in the country, which the central 
government may be forced to do given an absence of knowledge on local preferences or 
otherwise (political) inability to discriminate among jurisdictions.14 This specialization of public 
good provision implies a potentially lower level of total expenditures. Proposition 4 is also in 
line with several hypotheses in the decentralization literature. Alternative explanations include: 
a) decentralization can lead to lower expenditures arising from a reduction in redistribution 
expenditures as a result of Tiebout sorting, which would imply income-homogeneous 
                                                
13 That is, given our assumption of the spatial distribution of individuals across the country and the correspondence 
of location and preferences. 
14 But see footnote 21 above. 
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jurisdictions; this is an argument originally made by Musgrave (Oates, 1985)15; or b) 
decentralization constitutes a disciplining force that provides a closer link between revenues and 
spending (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980). What is novel in our result in Proposition 4 is that the 
shrinking effect of decentralization on overall public expenditures does not depend on fiscal 
competition, as in Brennan and Buchanan, or on the reduction of redistributional expenditures as 
noted by Musgrave. However, our results presuppose some sort of Tiebout sorting and the 
inability of the central government to offer different packages, or discriminate, across local 
jurisdictions (in contrast to the assumptions in Besley & Coate (2003) and Lockwood (2002)). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to examining whether empirical support exists for the implications of our 
theoretical model. In this section we focus on testing the empirical validity of Proposition 3 on 
the relationship between decentralization and expenditure composition.16 
Model Specification  
To test Proposition 3, we define the dependent variable, Comp, as the ratio of education 
and health expenditures to total public expenditures. Thus, based upon our discussion in the 
previous section, we expect a priori that, all other things equal, more decentralized countries 
spend a higher share of their expenditures on education and health. In terms of the explanatory 
variables in the model, our main interest is on expenditure decentralization, Dec, which we 
measure as the share of subnational expenditures in total public expenditures.  
                                                
15 Income-homogenous jurisdictions may not be necessary for equilibrium to exist. Given heterogeneity of 
preferences and income, an allocation of households across communities may exist where stratification by income 
no longer holds (Epple & Platt, 1998). 
16 Testing the effects of decentralization on the equilibrium quantities of PPPG and PPG in Propositions 1 and 2 will 
involve very different data sets and we will perform this in future research. On the other hand, the public finance 
literature has tested the equivalent of Proposition 4 on many different occasions, especially in the case of the 
Leviathan model, with mixed results (Oates, 1985, 1989; Rodden, 2003).  
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A matrix X of control variables, includes population, population density, GDP per capita, 
and budget balance. We allow for potential differences in the impact of decentralization on 
expenditure composition in developing and developed countries by introducing an interaction 
term, Dev, between our decentalization measure and a dummy variable to capture OECD 
membership status. We employ panel data and thus specify the general estimation form as: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!,! = 𝐺 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐷𝐸𝐶!,! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽!𝑋!,! + 𝜇! + 𝜆! + 𝜐!,!              (4) 
where G(·) is a transformation function we apply due to the fractional nature of the dependent 
variable (discussed below), and where 𝜇! and 𝜆!  denote the unobservable individual country and 
time effects, respectively. The subscripts i and t denote country and time period, respectively.  
Estimation Strategy 
 The estimation of equation (4) raises several economeric issues: the potential endogeneity 
of the fiscal decentralization variable, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, the possibility of 
country and time-specific effects, and the fractional variable nature of the dependent variable.  
We employ three estimators to address these econometric issues and to examine whether our 
results are fragile with respect to alterations in our empirical approach.  This approach replicates 
and extends the existing literature, especially with respect to the question of endogeneity. 
We first examine the influence of fiscal decentralization on the composition of public 
expenditures using an error components estimator; this will also provide comparability with the 
earlier literature.17  We examine the appropriateness of a random effects GLS estimator versus a 
fixed effects Within estimator.  While we would prefer to employ a random effects estimator, as 
this would allow the inclusion of several time-inarviant variables (such as, ethnic 
                                                
17 Unlike previous analyses which rely primarily on OECD data (Sanz & Velázquez, 2004), our sample includes 
non-OECD members and we were unable to collect panel data for many of these countries with regards to 
population age structure. We are not certain of what effects that may have in our estimates, but previous studies have 
found none or little effect of population age structure on education spending (Fernandez & Rogerson, 1997; Poterba, 
1997).  
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fractionalization, colonial tradition, religious preference), a modified Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the effects are orthognal to the independent variables suggesting the need to 
use fixed effects. We use Likelihood Ratio and F-tests to examine if the country and time-
specific effects are jointly equal to zero and in all cases we reject the null hypothesis that the 
effects are jointly equal to zero. We thus include country and time-specific effects.  We 
unambigously reject the null hypotheses of homoscedasticity and no-serial correlation and 
adrress these concerns using a two-step process and Windmeijer corrected standard errors18. 
In order to control for endogeneity of the fiscal decentralization variable, we employ 
system-GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).19 Following 
Roodman (2008), we explicitly control for fixed time effects but do not include fixed individual 
country effects.20  The short time series and the persistence effect of the dependent variable 
clearly support the extra moment conditions of the system-GMM versus the difference-GMM 
(Baltagi, 2008; Blundell & Bond, 1998). We test the validity of the moment conditions by using 
the Hansen J-test.  We also test the hypothesis that the error term in the second order is not 
serially correlated using the Arellano-Bond test. The set of instruments in the System-GMM 
estimation was collapsed following the procedure proposed by Roodman (2008) to avoid the 
possibility of over fitting the endogenous variables.  
                                                
18 Following Wooldridge (2001), we strongly reject the null of no serial correlation (F(1,58)=107). Using a Breusch-
Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, we also strongly reject the null of homogeneity (Chi Squared(1) =33.4). 
19 Estimates from the more commonly used differences Arellano-Bond (1991), behave poorly in datasets with a 
large number of cross sections and a small number of time periods, in particular in models with persistent series 
(Arellano and  Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998, Bond 2002). That is when the autoregressive parameter alpha 
on an AR(1) model increases towards unity. These authors suggest the use of System-GMM, a system that includes 
equations in levels as well as in differences simultaneously. GMM estimation instruments potentially endogenous or 
predetermined variable with their lags t-1 or earlier in the transformed equations; and with contemporaneous first 
differences in the levels equation. 
20 Roodman (2008) notes that including fixed individual (country) specific effects would be a mistake as this would 
induce a Within groups transformation which would result in dynamic panel data bias.  Unlike the Within and GLS 
estimators, the system GMM estimator thus only includes fixed time effects. 
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Finally, we address the fractional variable nature of the dependent variable. The fiscal 
decentralization measure is constrained in the unit interval [0,1] and may not offer sufficient 
variation for estimation by OLS.21 We follow Papke and Wooldridge by using a quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QMLE), with fixed country and time specific effects, to guarantee that the 
predicted values of the dependent variable lie on the unit interval. With respect to the QMLE 
model, we control for serial correlation by correcting the estimated variance-covariance matrix. 
Utilizing the variance-covariance matrix is desirable as we are interested in examining a 
proposition in levels while the first differencing transformation would have changed the question 
under consideration to one of change-on-change. With respect to the fixed effects, the literature 
supports the argument that fully robust estimators work reasonably well even when the cross-
sectional sample size is not especially large relative to the time series dimension (Wooldridge, 
2001, 2003). Given the relatively small number of groups in our sample (N=59), the 
inconvenience of using a set of country dummies in order to control for unobserved country 
effects is not as great compared to the existing alternatives.22 
The Data 
 One common difficulty faced in the cross-country study of fiscal decentralization is how 
to properly measure the extent of decentralization. Ideally, we would construct a panel data set 
from measures of fiscal decentralization that effectively quantify the activities of subnational 
governments resulting from their autonomous or independent decisions. This would require 
classifying those expenditures and revenues that are under the effective control of the central 
                                                
21 See Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for a discussion of this issue. 
22 In contrast to the within and random estimation methods for linear models, the literature on fixed and random 
effects for nonlinear models is limited. One theoretical approach to control for unobserved effects in nonlinear 
models is to maximize a conditional likelihood, for which the unobserved effects are integrated out. This is done 
through a conditional joint distribution (W. Greene, 2004; W. H. Greene, 2001; Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; 
Wooldridge, 2001). Despite these computational advances, in most models it is not always possible to remove the 
unobserved effects from the density, especially in estimations with continuous dependent variables.  
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government as central government activities, regardless of the level of government at which 
these expenditures occurred or similarly those revenues that are the control of the central 
government as transfers, and so on. Constructing such a panel data set from measures of the 
decentralization of expenditures would require information on the overall level of political, 
administrative and fiscal autonomy of subnational governments (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 
2003).  While more detailed data are available for a number of OECD countries (Stegarescu, 
2005a, 2009), unfortunately, similar quality (and quantity) data are not readily available for a 
large number of developing countries. To examine the question of whether fiscal decentralization 
influences the composition of public across a sample of developed and developing countries, we 
are left with the standard, albeit imperfect, measure of fiscal decentralization based on 
expenditure (or revenue) ratio data. We define fiscal decentralization as the share of subnational 
government expenditures to general government expenditures.23  We employ the International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS) as the primary data 
source for expenditures of national and subnational governments.24 
 We would be remiss not to note that, due to a shift in recording methods, GFS data are 
not comparable across two distinct periods of time. From 1972 to approximately 2003 
(depending upon when the country switched to accrual reporting), the GFS contained 
information on a cash basis. After 2003, the GFS records data on an accrual basis and there is no 
                                                
23 Several authors have noted the pitfalls associated with the conventional measurement of fiscal decentralization 
(Dreher, Sturm, & Ursprung, 2006; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Fiva, 2006; Prud’homme, 1995; 
Stegarescu, 2005b). While some studies of fiscal decentralization have attempted to construct measures of 
decentralization net of grants and transfers and net of certain types of expenditures, we do not construct such 
measures, as we are not able to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, whether these techniques reduce or enhance 
the bias already present in our measures of fiscal decentralization.  
24 We use GFS data at the consolidated central government, regional and state government, and local government 
levels. For those countries that do not report consolidated central government data, we substitute data on the 
budgetary central government. Of the 180-plus potential countries in the GFS data set, we select countries that 
reported expenditures for at least the central government and at least one level of subnational government. We did 
not include those countries that stopped reporting expenditure information prior to 1990 and those countries whose 
reported data were mathematically inconsistent. We did include countries that reported zero or minimal expenditures 
for at least one subnational level of government. 
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existent method for reconciling the two subsets of data. For the purposes of this study, we 
employ the GFS data prior to the shift to accrual reporting. 
Combining the GFS data with the data extracted from the other data sources reduced the 
size of the data set from approximately 1,500 to approximately 1,149 observations due to 
missing observations for some control variables in the World Development Indicators dataset. 
The final panel dataset covers 59 countries from 1972-2003, albeit with gaps. Table 1 presents 
the variables used in the empirical model and their sources. Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive 
statistics of these variables and the sample countries and time periods, respectively.  
To test Proposition 3 regarding expenditure composition developed in the preceeding 
section, we need to classify observed public expenditures as either coming from pure public 
goods or from publicly provided private goods. We simplify this task by focusing on the 
identification of two public services as publicly provided private goods: education and health. 
Together these two services tend to represent a large share of decentralized expenditures in most 
countries. A standard technique to identify the degree of publicness of government services, used 
in studies related to the determinants of public expenditures and the demand for public goods, is 
the calculation of a crowding parameter (Blecha, 1987; Borcherding & Deacon, 1972; Gonzalez 
& Means, 1991; Gramlich & Rubinfeld, 1982; Martinez-Vazquez, 1982). Health and education 
expenditures should be classified as publicly provided private goods, subject to specific caveats 
on the measurement of the crowding parameter (Borcherding & Deacon, 1972; Oxley & Martin, 
1991; Saunders, 1993).  
 While we cannot provide empirical evidence at this juncture on the degree of crowding 
for education and health services in the sample countries, we believe that  it is relatively safe to 
assume that these two types of services generally do not exhibit the characteristics of non-
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excludability and non-rivalry of pure public goods.  With respect to the private nature of health 
services, over 60 percent of total health spending is out of pocket in low-income countries, 
relative to 20 percent in high-income countries. In Africa, out-of-pocket spending accounts for 
almost 50 percent of total health spending, on average, and in 31 African countries, it accounts 
for 30 percent or more of total health spending (Schieber, Fleisher, & Gottret, 2006). 
Immunization, sanitation, other public health services also appear to be non-exclusive but rival; 
while services of acute health care are clearly rival and exclusive (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 
1999). Similarly, classroom size limitations and number of teachers per student in most of the 
developing countries clearly add some degree of rivalry to education services.  
The raw data show that over the period 1972-2003 expenditure decentralization remained 
quite flat in OECD countries but increased quite significantly in Emerging and Developing 
countries (Figure 2). On the other hand,  the examination of the expenditure decentralization and 
the ratio of total education and health expenditures for the whole sample of countries over the 
same period suggests a positive relationship between these two variables (Figure 3). 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. From the perspective of this paper, the most 
important result is the positive, statistically significant, and robust influence of fiscal 
decentralization on the composition of public expenditures, as measured by the ratio of total 
health and education expenditures to total expenditures. The estimated coefficient for fiscal 
decentralization is positive and statistically significant across all models. This result is robust to 
modifications in the estimation models used. This suggests that higher levels of expenditure 
decentralization are associated with a higher share of public expenditures on health and 
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education in total expenditures, illustrating the potential impact of expenditure decentralization 
in developed and developing countries. Our results also provide an indirect test to the classical 
proposition that decentralization leads to increases in allocative efficiency via the better 
matching of taxpayers’ preferences.  
Briefly, the estimated coefficient for expenditure decentralization in levels is statistically 
significant using the fixed effects estimator. A one standard deviation increase in the level of 
expenditure decentralization appears to induce an approximate 2.8 percent increase in the share 
of education and health expenditures in the consolidated budget. This suggests, as posited by the 
theoretical model, that the share of PPPGs increases as the level of decentralization increases. 
The estimated coefficient for fiscal decentralization is also statistically significant at the 1% level 
using System-GMM.25 The Hansen J-test fails to reject the validity of instruments using the 
second lag of GDP growth. In both cases, fixed effects and system GMM, decentralization 
appears to positively and significantly influence expenditure composition, although the size of 
the estimated coefficient for decentralization is larger in system-GMM.  
 As previously noted, due to the fractional nature of the expenditure decentralization 
variable, only the QMLE’s predicted values are bound to the unit interval.  While it would be 
possible to estimate the marginal effect of decentralization on expenditure composition for the 
fixed effects or GMM predicted values, these marginal effects may result from predictions of 
expenditure composition that are not bounded by [0,1].  We thus argue that the QMLE’s 
estimated coefficients are most appropriate to estimate the marginal effect of fiscal 
decentralization on expenditure composition. The QMLE marginal effects are non-linear 
                                                
25 We determine the number of lags used in each particular specification based on the degree of exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables used with respect to the dependent variable (i.e., whether they are a priori assumed to be 
predetermined or endogenous), and on whether this lag level passes the tests for validity of the instruments (Hansen-
statistic) as well as of serial correlation of the disturbance term (evidence of an AR2 process in first differences 
indicates that the tested lag structure is invalid). 
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functions of the estimated coefficients and the specific values of the explanatory variables. Given 
the logistic density function g(z) = δG(z) / δz = exp(z)/(1+exp(z)]2, the QMLE marginal effects 
are equal to δE(y|x)/δxj = mj = g(xβ)βj. In order to find the marginal effects, we must choose 
values for the explanatory variables to estimate a scalar value for g(xβ), which then is multiplied 
to each variable’s coefficient. For this purpose, we choose the mean values of the explanatory 
variables, as reported in the descriptive statistics (Table 2).  
The estimated marginal effect of expenditure decentralization on expenditure 
composition is 0.22, that is, for a one standard deviation increase in the level of expenditure 
decentralization, the share of health and education expenditures increases by approximately 3.3 
percent.  While the marginal effect of decentralization is lower with the QMLE relative to the 
other estimators, we note that the finding that decentralization positively influences the share of 
health and education expenditures appears to be robust to a variety of estimation approaches. 
Let us now turn briefly to the other explanatory variables. The parameter for the 
interaction term for fiscal decentralization and industrial country status is negative and 
significant in the two-way error component fixed effect model. This result suggests that 
decentralization’s influence on expenditure composition may be attenuated in industrialized 
countries.26 We must caution, however, that the estimated coefficient for the OECD interaction 
variable was neither significant in the System GMM model nor the QMLE estimator and that this 
result bears further investigation. 
The coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant in the QMLE 
estimator. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant in the fixed effect and system 
                                                
26 Private service alternatives for education and health, for example, are likely to be more available in developed 
countries.  
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GMM models. This result suggests that the estimated coefficient may be sensitive to the type of 
instruments included in the model.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the budget balance in the two way 
error components fixed effects suggests that education and health expenditures may be more 
vulnerable to cuts (reducing their budget shares) in times of expenditure rationalization 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003; Lora & Olivera, 2007; Snyder & Yackovlev, 2000). Yet the 
coefficient for budget balance is not significant when estimated using system-GMM and QMLE. 
These results are consistent with other studies that assessed the impact of different measures of 
the business cycle and expenditure consolidation on social expenditures and found no evidence 
that social expenditures are more vulnerable to cuts during these types of episodes (Clements, 
Gupta, & Nozaki, 2011; Granado, Gupta, & Hajdenberg, 2010). 
Finally, regarding our composite measure of freedom, its coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant in all estimation models, suggesting that increased political rights and 
civil liberties, usually accompanied by greater accountability, increase the expenditure share of 
health and education.  
In summary, we find robust statistical evidence from cross country panel data that 
decentralization affects the composition of public expenditures by increasing the share of 
publicly provided private goods, as captured by public education and health. These results 
suggest that expenditure decentralization significantly influences the composition of public 
expenditures and we note that this finding is robust to alternative specification measures. Even at 
the lower bound of the results, expenditure decentralization shifts the composition of public 
expenditures towards PPPGs. Therefore these results offer strong support to Proposition 3 in our 
theoretical model.  
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5. Conclusion  
This paper set out to suggest an indirect test of the allocative efficiency effects of 
decentralization by examining the role of decentralization on the composition of public 
expenditures. We investigate this issue from a theoretical viewpoint by means of a distance-
sensitive representative agent model. By employing a two-dimensional space country framework 
we are able to integrate two features of fiscal decentralization: the distribution of expenditure 
assignments between two levels of government and the composition of public expenditures into 
two kinds of public goods. This approach allows us to represent the heterogeneous nature of 
tastes within a representative agent model. Among other implications of the model, we find that 
decentralization leads to a higher share of publicly provided private goods in total government 
expenditures. Our empirical analysis strongly supports this prediction of the model based on an 
unbalanced panel data set spanning 59 developed and developing economies over a period of 30 
years.  
The policy implications of our findings are intriguing. Decentralization trends all over the 
world are likely to result in a reallocation of resources in the public sectors from centrally 
provided PPGs to subnationally provided PPPGs. This higher emphasis of expenditures on 
education and health may not only yield increases in allocative efficiency and overall welfare, 
but also may support, given the key importance of expenditures on those services, national 
efforts for poverty alleviation and improving economic growth.   
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Table 1 
Variables 
 
Variable Definition Units Source 
Expenditure 
Composition 
Ratio of education expenditures 
plus heath expenditures to total 
expenditures 
Fraction 
(0-1) 
Calculated 
from GFS 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Ratio of total subnational 
expenditures to total national 
expenditures 
Fraction 
(0-1) 
Calculated 
from GFS 
Interaction Term Fiscal decentralization multiplied by 
the industrialization dummy 
Fraction 
(0-1) 
Authors’ 
Calculation 
Budget Balance Current and capital revenue and 
official grants received less total 
expenditure and lending minus 
repayments as a percentage from 
GDP all at national (central 
government or consolidated 
government) level. 
Fraction 
(0-1) 
Calculated from 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI)  
Freedom A composite index equal to ((14-
political rights score – civil rights 
score)/12). The resulting index 
ranges from 0 (least free) to 1 (most 
free). 
Fraction 
(0-1) 
Freedom 
House and 
Authors’ 
Calculations 
Gross Domestic 
Product Per Capita 
Gross Domestic Product divided by 
total population 
One 
hundred 
thousand 
constant 
US 
Dollars 
WDI 
Population Total population 10 
millions 
WDI 
Population density Total population divided by land 
area in square kilometers 
Thousands WDI 
Industrial Dummy 1 for members of the OECD, 0 
otherwise 
0 and 1 Calculated 
 
  
  25 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Expenditure Composition  1149 .334 .147 .052 .654 
Fiscal Decentralization 1149 .235 .150 .016 .601 
OECD Interaction Term 1149 .152 .185 0 .605 
Budget Balance 1149 -.017 .035 -.179 .142 
Freedom 1149 .766 .273 0 1 
Population 1149 .358 .830 .006 7.651 
Population Density 1149 .101 .128 .001 .843 
Per Capita GDP 1149 .105 .097 .002 .460 
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Table 3 
Sample Countries 
Country Years  Country Years 
Argentina 1978-79;  
1981-2002 
Australia 1972-2003 
Austria 1972-1997 Azerbaijan 1994-1999 
Bahrain 1975-1996 Belarus 1992-2002 
Belgium 1978-1988 Bolivia 1986-2003 
Brazil 1980-1994 Bulgaria 1988-2003 
Canada 1974-2003 Chile 1974-88;  
1992-2003 
Costa Rica 1972-1985;  
1987-1996 
Croatia 1994-2001 
Czech Republic 1993-2003 Denmark 1972-2003 
Dominican Republic 1973-1996 Estonia 1991-2001 
Fiji 1974-1993 Finland 1972-1997 
France 1975-1993 Georgia 1997-2001 
Germany 1972-96;  
1999-2003 
Hungary 1981-2002 
Iceland 1972-77;  
1979-2002 
India 1974-1985 
Indonesia 1975-1998 Ireland 1972-1997 
Israel 1974-2002 Kazakhstan 1997-2003 
Kenya 1972-84;  
1986-1994 
Kyrgyz Republic 1995-2001 
Latvia 1994-2003 Lithuania 1993-2003 
Luxembourg 1972-88; 
1990-95;1998-99; 
2000-2003 
Malaysia 1972-81;  
1985-1997 
Mauritius 1980-85;  
1987-99; 2002-03 
Mexico 1972-2000 
Moldova 1996-2003 Mongolia 1992-98; 2000-2002 
Netherlands 1975-1997 New Zealand 1992-2001; 2003 
Norway 1972-77;  
1980-2003 
Panama 1973-1994 
Paraguay 1973-80;  
1984-87; 1989-1993 
Philippines 1978-1992 
Poland 1994-2001 Romania 1981-2001 
Russia 1994-95; 1998-2003 Slovak Republic 1996-2003 
Slovenia 1993-2003 Spain 1972-85; 1987-2001 
Sweden 1972-2002 Switzerland 1972-84;  
1991-2001 
Thailand 1972-2003 United Kingdom 1974-2000 
United States 1972-2001 Uruguay 1973-84;  
1989-1997 
Zimbabwe 1976-1989   
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Table 4 
Composition of Public Expenditures 
Fixed Effects, GMM and QMLE Estimates 
 
 Two-
Way 
Fixed 
Effects 
  
System- 
GMM 
 
QMLE 
 Coefficient Marginal 
Effect (at 
Sample Mean) 
Fiscal Decentralization 0.38** 
(0.12) 
0.80** 
(0.29) 
1.04+ 
(0.62) 
0.22+ 
(0.13) 
OECD Interaction Term -0.79** 
(0.23) 
 
-0.10 
(0.33) 
-0.67 
(0.60) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
Budget Balance in % of GDP 0.20* 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.90 
(0.91) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
Population Density -0.05 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.47 
(0.48) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
Population 0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
GDP Per Capita 0.17 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
1.79* 
(0.84) 
0.38* 
(0.17) 
Freedom 0.05+ 
(0.03) 
0.10+ 
(0.06) 
0.88** 
(0.28) 
0.22** 
(0.06) 
Constant 0.3** 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
  
AR(1) p-value  0.05   
AR(2) p-value  0.40   
Hansen J-test  0.41   
Number of Instruments  41   
Countries 59 59 59 59 
Observations 1149 1149 1149 1149 
Notes: **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. For two way error components 
the quantities in (.) are the White corrected standard errors. Quantities in (.) for the System GMM estimators 
are the White corrected standard errors. The quantities in (.) for the QMLE marginal effects are the delta-
method standard errors. 
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Figure 1 
Median to the Median in a Two Dimensional Space 
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Figure 2 
Expenditure Decentralization 
1971-2003 
(Authors’ Calculations) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Social spending versus expenditure decentralization 
Pooled data 
Authors’ Calculations 
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Appendix 1 
  
Table A.1  
Deciding the Type and the Quantity of Public Goods 
Decision Type Quantity 
Pure Public Goods 
Who is the key 
decision maker? 
Where is the 
location of the key 
decision maker? 
Who is the key 
decision maker? 
Where is the 
location of the key 
decision maker? 
Type national 
median voter 
Middle of the 
country (vertical 
axis) 
Quantity national 
median voter. 
Determined by the 
distance to the 
national median 
(vertical axis)  
Median distance to 
the country median 
(vertical axis) 
PPPG’s 
Share θ  Type national median voter 
Middle of the 
country (horizontal 
axis) 
Quantity national 
median voter.  
Determined by the 
distance to the 
country median 
(horizontal axis) 
Median distance to 
the country median 
(horizontal axis) 
Share (1-θ) Type jurisdiction median voter 
Middlejurisdiction 
(horizontal axis) 
Quantity jurisdiction 
median voter. 
Determined by the 
distance to the 
middle of the 
jurisdiction 
(horizontal axis).  
Median distance to 
the jurisdiction 
median. (horizontal 
axis) 
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Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
 
 
(5) 
If J > 1, then δθ = -α( xic - xij ) < 0  
 and < 0 
(6) 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
(7) 
given that ⇒ > 0. 
 
  
Proof of Proposition 3 
Given normalized prices total expenditures must decrease, and the ratio PPPG to total 
expenditures must necessarily increase with decentralization. Taking the first derivative of the 
PPPG to total expenditures ratio with respect to decentralization, we note: 
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Since gθ < 0, sθ >0, (gθs - gsθ )<0 (g + s)2 > 0 which implies < 0. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Note that  
> 0.   (8) 
Given propositions 1 and 2, < 0, > 0, the sign of equation 8 is positive if . 
Rewriting equation (7) in terms of (equation 5) as:  
 
 (9) 
Define a constant ; rearranging equation (9):  or 
, given equation (6),  ⇒ c < 0 hence .  
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